LOGIC AS THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE, the position assigned to logic as theory of knowledge and the range of problems included in it are determined by the general philosophic view of the distinction between the reality to be apprelizndctl thought and the subjective nature of thought itself. There may be, therefore, numberless variations in the mode of treating logic with general adherence to the one point of view.' In the Dialcktik of Schleiertnacher, for example, the fundamental characteristic is the attempt to unite some portions of the Kantian analysis of cognition with Spinozistic metaphysic. Knowledge is regarded as the complex combination of intellect, the formative, unifying, idealizing faculty, and organization or receptivity of sense. The generality or common validity of cognition rests on the uniform nature of organization and on the identity of all ideas in the one ideal system. The objective worth of cognition is referred on the one hand to the determined connexion between the real universe and the organization through which the individual is part of the real order of things, on the other hand to the ultimate metaphysical parallelism between the system of ideas and reality. The primary forms of knowledge, notion, and judgment, distinct from one another only as being knowledge viewed now as stable now as in process, correspond to the ultimate elements of the real, the permanent force or substance and its variable manifestations. Syllogism and induction, with the subordinate processes of definition and division, analysis and synthesis, are technical modes of the development of notions and judgments, modes by which inchoate notions are rendered definite, by which incomplete judgments arc rendered complete.' That there is much valuable and suggestive material in this mode of regarding logic is undoubted, and in the discussion of isolated forms of knowledge, such as judgment, it is always desirable that there should be kept iu mind the reference to the ultimate character of objectivity. But the whole point of view seems imperfect and open to such objections as will always present themselves when a principle is not carried out to its full extent. It may, for propndentic purposes, be desirable to separate the handling of logical forms from metaphysic, but such separation cannot be ultimate. The system of forms of reality to which the forms of knowledge are assumed to correspond must in some way enter into knowledge, and they cannot enter in as an absolutely foreign ingredient, to which knowledge has simply to conform itself. For, if so, these metaphysical categories would be discoverable only by an analysis of concrete knowledge, and they would remain as inferences from the nature of cognition, not as data directly known. The cardinal difficulty which appears in all treatments of logic from this point of view is that of explaining how there comes to be known an objective system of things with characteristic forms or aspects, and it is not hard to see that the acceptance of a reality so formed is but a relic of the pernicious abstraction which gave rise to the Kantian severance of knowledge from noumenal reality.' In short the position taken by Schleiermacher and his school, as final standing ground, is but an intermediate stage in the development of that which lay implicit in the critical philosophy.

Moreover, it is hardly possible to assume this point of view without tending to fall back into that mechanical view of knowledge from which Kant had endeavoured to free philosophy. If there be assumed the severance between real and ideal, it is hardly possible to avoid deduction of all that is characteristic of the ideal order from the observed or conjectured. psychological peculiarities of inner experience. The real appears only as ultimate point of reference, but in no other way determines the form of knowledge. The characteristic relations which give content to notions, judgments, and syllogisms arc deduced psychologically.? In the long run, it would no doubt be found that the real key to the position is the belief, more or less expressed, that the systematic view of thought as comprehending and evolving the forms of reality is an unattainable ideal, - that metaphysic, to put it briefly, is impossible. To sonic extent this is the position taken by Lotze, whose cautious and ever thoughtful expositions are invariably directed to the elucidation of the real nodi, the real roots of perplexity or incompleteness of doctrine. In his view logical forms are the modes in which thought works up the material, supplied in inner experience by the psychological mechanism of the soul, in conformity to the ultimate presuppositions with the aid of which alone can harmony, or ethical and esthetic completeness, be gained for our conceptions of things. But with this doctrine, which approaches more clearly than any other of the type to the metaphysical logic, there is coupled the reserve that any actual point of view from which the development of these presuppositions, their rational explanation, might become possible is unattainable. Our confidence in them is finally of an ethical character, and depends upon our conviction of the ethical end or purpose of all the surroundings within which human life and character is manifested. In logic as in metaphysic we must content ourselves with more or less fragmentary treatment.' Logic as Metaphysical.