The Space Shuttle Program - The Columbia Accident

Immediately after the Columbia disaster, President Bush appointed a panel to investigate what happened. The panel was called the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) or the Gehman Board. In June 2003 the CAIB released its report. The CAIB concluded that the most likely cause of the accident was a damaged thermal protection tile on the orbiter's left wing. Video clips of the launch showed a large piece of foam falling off the external tank and striking the left wing eighty-two seconds after lift-off. This piece of foam fell a distance of only fifty-eight feet. However, the space shuttle was traveling very fast when this occurred, so the foam struck with extreme force.

NASA engineers knew about the foam strike, but were unsure whether it had caused any damage. While the Columbia was in orbit, some engineers suggested that high-resolution photographs be taken of the orbiter using Department of Defense satellites or NASA's ground-based telescopes. This suggestion was overruled by NASA officials who believed that the foam strike did not endanger mission safety.

During reentry to earth's atmosphere, one or more thermal tiles along the left wing likely allowed hot gases to breach the shuttle structure. Aerodynamic stresses then tore it apart. Debris from the shuttle was found spread along a corridor across southeastern Texas and into Louisiana.

The CAIB report was extremely critical of the entire shuttle program and complained that NASA shuttle managers had once again become preoccupied with schedule, rather than safety. Beginning in 1998 the shuttle program was under tremendous pressure to meet construction deadlines for the International Space Station (ISS). Nearly every shuttle flight undertaken between 1999 and 2003 was in support of the ISS.

The CAIB recommended a number of major changes within the shuttle program and within NASA management. One of the recommendations was that NASA develop a means for the shuttle crew to inspect the orbiter while docked at the ISS and repair any damage discovered. Such a procedure might have saved the Columbia crew. Implementation of the so-called "Safe Haven" program was recommended prior to any future shuttle flight.

TABLE 4.4
Mission profile of the STS-107 Columbia shuttle, 2003

Crew
Commander:	Rick D. Husband
Pilot:	William C. McCool
Mission Specialist 1:	David M. Brown
Mission Specialist 2:	Kalpana Chawla
Mission Specialist 3:	Michael P. Anderson (Payload Commander)
Mission Specialist 4:	Laurel B. Clark
Payload Specialist:	Ilan Ramon
Launch
Orbiter:	Columbia (OV-102)
Launch site:	Kennedy Space Center Launch Pad 39A
Launch window:	2.5 hours
Altitude:	150 nautical miles
Inclination:	39 degrees
Duration:	15 days, 22 hours, 17 minutes
Vehicle data
Shuttle liftoff weight:	452,842 lbs.
Orbiter/payload liftoff weight:	263,701 lbs.
Orbiter/payload landing weight:	232,788 lbs.
Software version:	OI-29
SOURCE: "Mission Profile," in STS-107 Shuttle Press Kit, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, DC, December 16, 2002 [Online] http://www.shuttlepresskit.com/STS-107/STS-107_SPK.pdf [accessed January 12, 2004]