Salina, Kansas, Denies Individual Rights to Gun Ownership
The Supreme Court of Kansas ruled in 1905 that the right to possess or carry a handgun for self-defense was not absolute (Salina v. Blaksley [83 P. 619, 1905]). James Blaksley was convicted of carrying a pistol within the city of Salina while under the influence of alcohol. The Kansas Supreme Court held that individual rights to carry were not protected by the state constitution and decided that "only to the people collectively as members of legitimate military organizations is the right guaranteed and then only to weapons of the type used in civilized warfare."
Portland, Oregon, Regulates Possession of Guns
The city of Portland, Oregon, passed an ordinance prohibiting "any person on a public street or in a public place to carry a firearm upon his person, or in a vehicle under his control or in which he is an occupant, unless all ammunition has been removed from the chamber and from the cylinder, clip or magazine" (Portland Ordinance No. 138210, Sec. No. 14.32.010). In 1982 Michael Boyce was convicted of violating this statute, and he appealed, contending that the law violated Article I, Section 27, of the Oregon Constitution, which states, "The people shall have their right to bear arms for the defense of themselves, and the State, but the Military shall be kept in strict subordination to the civil power."
Boyce based his case on State v. Kessler and State v. Blocker (630 P.2d 824, 1981), in which the State Supreme Court declared unconstitutional an Oregon law banning a number of weapons, including switchblades, billy clubs, and blackjacks. However, the court of appeals did not see the similarities and upheld the lower court's conviction (State v. Boyce [658 P.2d 577, 1983]). The court observed that the statute in Kessler and Blocker forbids the "mere possession" of certain weapons and that was the characteristic that made it unconstitutional. The statute in this case regulates only the manner of possession, something both Kessler and Blocker recognized as permissible when the regulation was reasonable. The city of Portland could regulate use of weapons within its borders.
In fulfilling its obligation to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens, a government body must sometimes pass legislation that touches upon a right guaranteed by the state or federal constitution. Such an encroachment is permissible when the unrestricted exercise of the right poses a clear threat to the "interests and welfare of the public in general" and the means chosen by the government body do not unreasonably interfere with the right.
The court agreed that individuals had a right to protect their property and themselves
… when a threat to person or property arises in the victim's defense capacity. It is true, on the other hand, that, when the threat arises in a public place, the fact that a person must have any ammunition separated from his firearm will hinder him to the extent that he is put to the trouble of loading the weapon.
However, given the magnitude of the city's felt need to protect the public from an epidemic of random shootings, we think that the hindrance is permissible.
Renton, Washington—Guns Not Permitted Where Alcohol Is Served
The city of Renton, Washington, enacted Municipal Ordinance 34-59, which states,
It is unlawful for anyone on or in any premise in the City of Renton where alcoholic beverages are dispensed by the drink to … carry any rifle, shotgun or pistol, whether said person has a license or permit to carry said firearm or not, and whether said firearm is concealed or not.
Four residents, with the support of the Second Amendment Foundation, a non-profit group that promotes the right to bear arms, went to court seeking an injunction on the ordinance, claiming it violated state law and was unconstitutional. The Superior Court of King County upheld the city ordinance, and the Second Amendment Foundation took the case to the Court of Appeals of Washington.
Article 1, Paragraph 24, of the Washington Constitution states,
The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself, or the state, shall not be impaired, but nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing individuals or corporations to organize, maintain or employ an armed body of men.
The Court of Appeals indicated that "it has long been recognized that the constitutional right to keep and bear arms is subject to reasonable regulation by the State under its police power" (Second Amendment Foundation v. City of Renton [668 F.2d 596, 1983]). Simply because something is guaranteed by either the state or federal constitution does not mean that it cannot be regulated, declared the court:
The scope of permissible regulation must depend upon a balancing of the public benefit to be derived from the regulation against the degree to which it frustrates the purposes of the constitutional provision. The right to own and bear arms is only minimally reduced by limiting their possession in bars. The benefit to public safety by reducing the possibility of armed conflict while under the influence of alcohol outweighs the general right to bear arms in defense of self and state.
… On balance, the public's right to a limited and reasonable exercise of police power must prevail against the individual's right to bear arms in public places where liquor is served.
Furthermore, stated the court, the statutes "do not expressly state an unqualified right to be in possession of a firearm at any time or place." Had the city of Renton instituted "an absolute and unqualified local prohibition against possession of a pistol by the holder of a state permit," it would have conflicted with state law and Washington's constitution. This it did not do. Rather the city had instituted a law "which is a limited prohibition reasonably related to particular places and necessary to protect the public safety, health, morals and general welfare."
Finally, the court of appeals noted that "while thirtysix states have constitutional provisions concerning the right to bear arms, in none is the right deemed absolute." Furthermore, "those states with constitutional provisions similar to ours (Alabama, Michigan, Wyoming, Oregon, Indiana) have uniformly held the right subject to reasonable exercise of the police power." The city of Renton was within its rights when it passed the ordinance barring firearms from bars, and the court upheld the decision of the lower court.
Morton Grove, Illinois—Handguns Are Banned
As soon as Morton Grove, Illinois, a Chicago suburb, passed an ordinance banning handguns in 1981, handgun owners challenged the city in court. Section 22 of the Illinois constitution provides that "subject only to the police power, the right to bear arms shall not be infringed." Handgun owners raised issues of the right to bear arms as set forth in state and federal constitutions and further contended that if Morton Grove were allowed to pass such laws in contradiction to other towns and cities, a "patchwork quilt" situation would result. Opponents argued that a handgun owner would never know if he or she were violating a law when traveling through the town.
Morton Grove defended itself, claiming it was within its power to limit or ban the possession of handguns if city officials believed handgun possession was a threat to peace and stability. They further claimed that their ordinance did not violate Section 22 of the Illinois constitution because it guaranteed the right to keep "some guns." The Morton Grove law did not ban all guns, only handguns.
LEGAL PROCEEDINGS. The cases of Victor Quilici, Robert Stengl, George Reichert, and Robert Metler were combined and brought to the Federal District Court of Northern Illinois. The court upheld the town's right to ban handguns (Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove [532 F.Supp. 1169, 1981]). The U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh District, also upheld the findings of the district court (695 F.2d 261 [7th Cir. 1982]), saying "the right to keep and bear handguns is not guaranteed by the Second Amendment." In 1983 the case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which denied certiorari (to hear the case), and the ruling of the lower court of appeals was upheld.
A NEW ROUTE. The Morton Grove handgun owners then went to the Circuit Court of Cook County to get an injunction to prevent Morton Grove from instituting the ordinance banning handguns. The county circuit court upheld the validity of the ordinance. The handgun owners next appealed to the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division. That court upheld the decisions of the lower courts (Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove [447 NE.2d 849, 1983]). While the court agreed with the handgun owners that "gun control legislation could vary from municipality to municipality, we find that the framers [of the Illinois constitution] envisioned this kind of local control."
The case was again appealed, and on October 19, 1984, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' decisions (Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove [53 LW 2233]). Agreeing with earlier observations, the state's highest court noted that "while the right to possess firearms for the purposes of self-defense may be necessary to protect important personal liberties from encroachment by others, it does not lie at the heart of the relationship between individuals and their government." Thus, Morton Grove needed only to have had a "rational basis" for instituting its ban on handguns.
Consequently, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded,
Because of the comparative ease with which handguns can be concealed and handled, a ban on handguns could rationally have been viewed as a way of reducing the frequency of premeditated violent attacks as well as unplanned criminal shootings in the heat of passion or an overreaction to fears of assault, accidental shootings by children or by adults who are unaware that a handgun is loaded, or suicides. The ordinance is a proper exercise of the police power.
Chicago Limits Handgun Possession
On March 19, 1982, the Chicago City Council passed an ordinance prohibiting the registration of any handgun after April 10, 1982, the effective date of the ordinance, unless it was "validly registered to a current owner in the City of Chicago" before April 10, 1982 (Municipal Code of the City of Chicago, Chapter 11.1-3[c]). Jerome Sklar lived in neighboring Skokie, Illinois, when the law was passed. He owned a handgun and had a valid, current Illinois Firearms Identification Card. On April 15, 1982, after the ordinance had gone into effect, he moved to Chicago. He could not register the weapon and, therefore, was unable to bring it into the city.
Sklar went to court, claiming that the city of Chicago had violated the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution because he was unable to register the gun that he owned, while owners of firearms who resided in Chicago before the effective date of the ordinance had an opportunity to take advantage of the law's registration requirements. By this time, Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove had been decided in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, a decision that applied to this judicial region. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois therefore indicated that "Quilici compels this court to conclude that the Chicago firearms ordinance does not infringe on a constitutionally protected right." The court concluded that the city of Chicago had legitimately and rationally used its police power to promote the health and safety of its citizens. Sklar's argument that Chicago could have chosen better ways to protect its citizens from the negative effects of firearms was irrelevant.
The court concluded that the ordinance did not violate the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution by limiting new registrations instead of banning handguns altogether. The city was under no legal requirement to take an all or nothing approach to limiting handguns.
Sklar appealed the district court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, the same court that had so recently ruled on Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove. In his appeal, Sklar claimed that his constitutionally guaranteed right to travel had been violated, since he could not move into Chicago without giving up his gun. The court upheld the lower court, citing the precedent established in Quilici (Sklar v. Byrne [727 F.2d 633, 1984]). The court did not believe that a fundamental constitutional issue was involved. Therefore, the city of Chicago had a right to institute local regulations as long as it did not go overboard:
The Chicago handgun ordinance as a whole promotes legitimate government goals…. The council found that handguns and other firearms play a major role in crimes and accidental deaths and injuries, and that the "convenient availability" of firearms and ammunition contributed to deaths and injuries in Chicago. The council therefore enacted the ordinance to restrict the availability of firearms and thereby to prevent some deaths and injuries among Chicago citizens. The city's primary goals are thus classic examples of the city's police power to protect the health and safety of its citizens.
Sklar argued it was irrational and "inconsistent with the overall purposes of the ordinance" to allow some people to have handguns and others not to and not to classify gun owners on the basis of their ability to handle handguns safely. "That argument," said the court in dismissing his claim,
… essentially asks this court to second-guess the judgment of the city council. The Constitution does not require the city council to act with a single purpose or to be entirely consistent. Indeed, the council is a political body for the accommodation of many conflicting interests…. The Constitution does not require the city coun cil to enact the perfect law. The council may proceed step by step "adopting regulations that only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and deferring complete elimination of the evil to future regulations."
In both Quilici and Sklar, the courts were not saying that handgun control is or is not a good decision for any local authority to make. They did not see the possession of a handgun as a fundamental right protected by either the federal or the state constitution. The courts stated that a town or city, under the police powers granted it by American tradition and the constitution of the state of Illinois, has the right to make a decision and implement such an ordinance for its people. A local ordinance does not have to be consistent, as long as the city council can prove that it thought out its decision rationally.
West Hollywood, California—Saturday Night Specials
In late 1998 the Supreme Court of California let stand a ruling by the California Court of Appeals upholding the municipal ban by the city of West Hollywood on the sale of so-called Saturday Night Special handguns. Several of the manufacturers of these inexpensive weapons are located within fifty miles of the city. In its opinion, the court rejected the gun lobby's claim that California state law pre-empted the ordinance and found that the ban did not violate the principles of equal protection or due process. Gun rights advocates contend that singling out inexpensive weapons denies poor people an affordable means of self-defense.
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