The Threat of Conventional Weapons - Trade In Conventional Weapons

Although international transfers of major conventional weapons have generally declined since their peak in 1997, vigorous trade in such weapons continues. (See Figure 2.1.)

Most arms sales go to developing countries, particularly those involved in regional conflicts or disputes. Among the biggest importers of arms are China, Taiwan, Israel, India, and Turkey. As a region, the Near East is the largest buyer of arms, followed by Asia, Africa, and Latin America. African countries have shown the largest increase in arms purchases in the period from 1995 through 2002. (See Table 2.1.)

Trends and Players

In previous decades, the cold war saw the increased export of arms from the U.S. and Soviet blocs to countries around the world to help maintain regional strongholds and, thereby, the balance of power. Both sides were also eager to ship weapons to their Third World allies to support various "national movements" or to suppress insurgent (rebel) activities. Such regional hotspots as Iran/Iraq, Pakistan/India, and Afghanistan became lucrative markets for arms sales. Unfortunately, these weapons were often used by corrupt regimes against ethnic minorities or to commit other human rights violations. Developing countries that spent millions of dollars acquiring weapons and weapons systems diverted resources from critical social programs.

The end of the cold war disrupted the worldwide arms flow but did not bring an end to global hostilities. Conflicts in the Balkans and Africa, as well as intrastate and interstate tensions in the former Soviet bloc, continued to create markets for weapons. Although the disintegration of the Soviet Union temporarily halted arms sales from that region, the immediate need for hard currency in the newly independent states and the abundance of Soviet-made weapons and weapons systems drove them onto the arms market.

The first years of the twenty-first century have seen an interesting pattern of buyers and sellers that is different from the sales patterns established during the cold war. Key Western allies, such as Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have turned to the former Soviet states for certain weapons systems, as have China and Iran. Russia aggressively marketed its defense equipment in order to raise funds to help stabilize its fledgling market economy and finance its oil sector. Despite Russia's internal political upheavals and problems within the military, countries including Kuwait, India, the UAE, and Malaysia still view it as a strong military supplier. Russia sold T-72 tanks to Syria and Su-30 fighter jets and SA-20 surface-to-air missiles to China, much to the displeasure of the American government.

The U.S. Role

U.S. ARMS EXPORTS. Western arms sales go not only to developing countries but also to such key U.S. allies as Israel, Taiwan, certain Persian Gulf states, and NATO countries. Frequently, countries such as Pakistan and Israel use U.S. military assistance programs to finance the purchase of American military equipment. These high-quality, American-made weapons, though sold to U.S. allies, can eventually find their way into various states of concern and into the hands of dangerous transnational groups (terrorists and organized crime) after the initial exchange. U.S. armed forces are accustomed to using these weapons, not facing them in the hands of opposing armed forces. This is a source of concern to defense planners.

Despite U.S. concern about American-made weapons being used against U.S. troops, the United States was the world's largest weapons supplier between 1995 and 2002. (See Table 2.2.)

"U.S. Policy on Small/Light Arms Export," a report prepared by Lora Lumpe of the Federation of American Scientists for the Academy of Arts and Sciences Conference on Controlling Small Arms, December 1997, identified five primary channels through which arms leave the United States:

1. Foreign military sales (FMS), which are negotiated at a state level between governments
2. Excess defense weapons under the Foreign Assistance Act
3. Direct industry sales
4. Covert government operations
5. Illegal markets

According to the Congressional Research Service's report Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1995–2002, some of the major weapons sales by the United States in 2002 included:

• Sixteen AH-64 Apache helicopters and related equipment to Kuwait (valued at $870 million)
• Ten F-16 C/D combat fighter aircraft to Chile (valued at $500 million)
• Three Aegis combat systems to South Korea for its KDX-3 destroyers (valued at over $960 million)
• Twelve F-16 C/D fighter aircraft, munitions, and support to Oman (valued at over $700 million)

THE REGULATION AND CONTROL OF U.S. ARMS SALES.U.S. arms sales are technically governed by regulations that forbid sales to certain countries of concern and regimes known to be oppressive. The 1976 Arms Export Control Act (AECA), overseen by the Office of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC) within the Bureau of Political Military Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, is the primary law regulating U.S. arms sales. AECA mandates that American weapons must be exported only for United Nations (UN) operations, self-defense purposes, and as responses to internal security threats. It also requires the Departments of Defense and State to produce regular

TABLE 2.1

Regional arms transfer agreements, by supplier, 1995–2002
(in millions of current U.S. dollars)
	Asia		Near East		Latin America		Africa
	1995–98	1999–02	1995–98	1999–02	1995–98	1999–02	1995–98	1999–02
Note: All foreign data are rounded to the nearest $100 million. The United States total for Near East in 1999–2002 includes a $6.432 billion licensed commercial agreement with the United Arab Emirates in 2000 for 80 F-16 aircraft.
*Major West European category included France, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy.
SOURCE: "Table 1C. Regional Arms Transfer Agreements, by Supplier, 1995–2002," in Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1995–2002, Congressional Research Service, September 22, 2003, http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32084.pdf (accessed September 23, 2004)
United States	5,426	6,462	13,314	27,207	1,245	1,877	89	109
Russia	13,100	18,000	1,800	2,200	400	200	600	1,500
France	1,100	3,400	8,600	500	500	0	100	600
United Kingdom	3,800	500	1,200	600	0	0	200	700
China	1,200	2,600	1,400	600	100	100	500	800
Germany	1,600	1,000	100	400	200	100	0	1,600
Italy	800	100	100	400	400	200	100	300
All other European	1,900	1,200	3,100	2,100	1,900	600	700	3,800
All others	2,700	2,000	1,200	1,900	1,000	600	800	800
Major West European*	7,300	5,000	10,000	1,900	1,100	300	400	3,200
Total	31,626	35,262	30,814	35,907	5,745	3,677	3,089	10,209

TABLE 2.2

Arms deliveries to the world, by supplier, 1995–2002
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	Total 1995–2002
SOURCE: "Table 9A. Arms Deliveries to the World, by Supplier, 1995–2002," in Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1995–2002, Congressional Research Service, September 22, 2003, http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32084.pdf (accessed September 23, 2004)
United States	19,382	17,633	19,044	19,097	19,877	13,871	9,987	10,241	129,133
Russia	4,482	3,909	3,018	2,490	3,429	4,312	4,402	3,100	29,141
France	3,755	4,620	7,777	8,261	4,646	2,695	1,886	1,800	35,440
United Kingdom	6,420	7,701	7,893	4,300	5,530	7,007	4,716	4,700	48,267
China	848	829	1,277	792	442	862	734	800	6,585
Germany	2,665	2,251	1,393	1,697	2,433	1,401	629	500	12,970
Italy	242	118	464	226	664	323	210	400	2,648
All other European	4,239	4,028	5,107	3,734	3,208	3,126	2,096	1,800	27,339
All others	2,422	2,369	2,902	2,037	2,544	2,156	2,306	2,100	18,836
Total	44,455	43,459	48,875	42,634	42,773	35,756	26,965	25,441	310,358

reports and notify Congress of any significant arms sales. The ODTC is responsible for the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, which contains a list of all munitions acceptable for export. All companies wishing to sell such equipment need to register with the ODTC and obtain the appropriate export license before concluding any sales.

Another important law regulating U.S. arms sales is the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, which calls for military and other developmental aid to friendly governments. This law bars any sales to oppressive governments and countries adhering to policies contrary to American values and beliefs.

These regulations have not always proved effective, as demonstrated by arms sales to oppressive regimes such as Iraq (during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980–88) and Indonesia. Perhaps the biggest blow to U.S. credibility on its arms export policies was the Iran-contra affair. In November 1986 officials of the administration of President Ronald Reagan announced that some of the money earned from arms sales to Iran had been redirected to aid the Nicaraguan contras (rebels), an act that violated an existing ban on aid to Nicaraguan military and paramilitary activities. The arms sales to Iran had been conducted primarily to secure the release of Americans held hostage in the Middle East. High-ranking members of the Reagan administration, including President Reagan himself, Vice President George H. W. Bush, National Security Advisor John Poindexter, Secretary of State George Schultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and Director of Central Intelligence William Casey were aware of the arms sales, but how many members of the administration were directly aware that the money was being rerouted to the contras is not clear. The independent investigation that followed embroiled the Reagan administration in a major scandal; National Security Advisor John Poindexter, former National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, and their assistant Lt. Col. Oliver North resigned as a result.

The U.S. Department of State began the Blue Lantern program in 1990 to strengthen U.S. export controls to make sure U.S. arms exports do not end up in the wrong hands or abet any illicit supply networks. The primary function of the program is to perform end-use checks on all U.S. arms exports. Generally conducted by U.S. personnel abroad, their purpose is to ensure the material is not acquired using fraudulent documentation. The Blue Lantern program is designed to promote the responsible sale of weapons to allies and to prevent the transfer of dual-use technology to adversaries. (Dual-use items are controlled materials that have either military or civilian applications.)

According to the State Department, in 2003 the ODTC conducted 413 checks and discovered 76 transactions that were in violation of established policies. Of these, the majority (47%) of recipients were in the Western Hemisphere, followed by Asia (22%), Europe (18%), the Near East and South Asia (at 5% each), and Africa (3%). (See Figure 2.2.) Most of the sales in the Western Hemisphere involved firearms, ammunition, and explosives. Sales in Asia were often aircraft and helicopter spare parts. In "End-Use Monitoring of Defense Articles and Defense Services Commercial Exports," the State Department reported that in fiscal year (FY) 2003 cooperation between U.S. Customs and the State Department led to more than 665 commercial arms seizures, worth more than $106 million.

Other Countries

A number of countries acquire weapons to either expand or replace military equipment, and there is intense and increasing competition among weapons suppliers. In addition to the United States, countries including France, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and Germany are also significant players on the world arms market. According to the Stocklholm International Peace Research Institute in 2004, Russia's weapon sales were about $7 billion in 2003. For the period 1999 through 2003, Russia sold $26.2 billion worth of weapons. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom followed with $6.4, $5.2, and $4.2 billion worth of sales, respectively, over the same period.

Although weapons sales by European countries declined in the early twenty-first century, especially sales to developing countries, Western European contractors heavily compete with American companies for sales. Additionally, they have historically served as significant suppliers in the conventional arms market to those countries that are not traditional clients of the United States.

Russia's increased arms trade is a direct result of the economic and political turmoil Russia faced after the

FIGURE 2.2

Soviet breakup. It continues to supply its past allies and those already familiar with Russian technology, including India, China, and Iran. In March 2003 the U.S. charged (Daily Telegraph, March 25, 2003) that Russia had violated UN trade sanctions by supplying Iraq with advanced weaponry, including anti-tank missiles and night-vision goggles. Illicit arms sales are also a continuing problem. According to a 2001 UN report on illicit arms traffic (Report of the Panel of Experts Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001), paragraph 19, concerning Liberia, United Nations, New York, NY, October 26, 2001), former KGB officer Victor Bout is a leading arms dealer who sells millions of dollars worth of Russian and Eastern European weapons to embargoed African countries engaged in civil wars.

In comparison with other states, China entered the arms market somewhat late, in the 1980s. With sales of approximately $1.5 billion from 1999 to 2003, China supplies arms to countries unable to afford newer, more sophisticated technology. It sold antiship missiles to Iran and remains the primary supplier for Pakistan. China is rumored to have provided missile technology to Iran and North Korea, raising concerns within the arms control community.

The Persian Gulf remains one of the most active theaters when it comes to arms sales. Five states surrounding the Gulf (Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Yemen) and five more in its near vicinity (Egypt, Israel, Libya, Syria, and Turkey) possess ballistic missile capabilities and are prime buyers of Western weapons equipment. Along with these missile capabilities, several other factors make this region of particular importance to the West. These include energy resources (there is an abundance of oil and natural gas fields in the region), the Iranian threat (the country has defiantly continued to develop its nuclear weapons capability), and strategic military alliances (Israel, Egypt, and Jordan all serve as important Western allies in the area). Extensive talks have taken place among U.S. and regional policy makers about the implications of deploying a theater missile defense in the Gulf. The main purpose of deploying this system would be to protect U.S. vital strategic interests and those of its main regional allies: member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Contributing to a heightened perception of threats for most states in this theater are past use of WMD, revelations about Iranian and Iraqi WMD programs, and the instability in other Gulf states and the former Soviet Union. Accordingly, purchasing top-of-the-line equipment is a strong priority for the defense ministries of these countries.

An ongoing Cooperative Defense Initiative between the United States and its GCC allies, focuses, among other things, on improved interoperability (coordination between two separate entities, such as by holding joint exercises and simulations) among these countries. Also, through the Hizam al-Taawun ("belt of cooperation") project, these states are coordinating their shared early warning and air defense systems. This should theoretically allow the GCC states to pool their defense resources, spending less money individually but sharing in collective security. The project was initially undertaken in 1997, when GCC defense ministers collectively agreed to purchase "a $500 million ground-based early warning system that would link the GCC states' radars and communication systems" (Robert Shuey, "Theater Missile Defense: Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, May 22, 2001). Nevertheless, besides a few Patriot units deployed in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the region still lacks a cohesive joint infrastructure to protect against missile attacks. (Patriot units consist of the Patriot missile, its launcher, high-tech radar, and an engagement control station [a station where operators control the missiles and identify targets]. The Patriot missile is a high-velocity missile that focuses on neutralizing incoming missiles before they hit the ground. It can achieve supersonic speed within twenty feet of leaving the launcher and has a range of at least 100 kilometers.)

Arms Importers

On the receiving end of arms sales, the United States obtained less than $1.3 billion worth of arms from 1999 to 2003, ranking number twenty-seven in the world in arms imports, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in 2004. China was the largest arms importer, receiving $11.8 billion worth of major conventional weapons from 1999 to 2003. India ranked second with $7.8 billion worth of imports over the same period, followed by Greece ($4.4 billion), Turkey ($3.5 billion), and the United Kingdom ($3.3 billion). Two countries showed particularly dramatic increases in their arms imports during this period: Greece (from $556 million annually to $2 billion annually) and India (from $1 billion annually to $3.6 billion annually).