The Threat of Conventional Weapons - Treaties And Regimes

International treaties are intended to restrain the development and potential use of conventional weapons. They are sometimes limited, either by the types of weapons included in the treaty (for example, a treaty dealing only with land mines) or their application (they may not be signed by all parties with the type or types of weapons concerned). In efforts to reduce the threat to its own security, the United States has proposed, signed, and ratified many such treaties over the years, particularly with the Soviet Union during the cold war era. Many of these treaties are bilateral (involving two parties), but some have been ratified or signed by other countries, especially the Warsaw Pact Organization countries, which were allied with the Soviet Union, and the countries of NATO, which are allied with the United States.

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was originally drafted primarily for NATO and Warsaw Pact countries and was signed on November 19, 1990. Because of the breakup of the Soviet Union and other changes in Europe, thirty states now are parties to this treaty, which aims to restrict the overwhelming number of conventional forces in Europe. As of 2004, members of the CFE include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States. As new members are added to NATO, each will be asked to comply with CFE requirements.

In November 2002, at a NATO conference in Prague, Secretary General George Robertson stated that NATO: "reiterated the goals, principles and commitments contained in the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, and in the Rome Declaration. Reaffirming adherence to the CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of European security, [NATO] agreed to continue to work cooperatively toward ratification by all the States Parties and entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty, which would permit accession by non-CFE states." He also "welcomed the approach of those non-CFE countries who have stated their intention to request accession to the adapted CFE Treaty upon its entry into force, and agreed that their accession would provide an important additional contribution to European stability and security."

"The Atlantic to the Urals" is the so-called area of application (AOA) for the CFE. This means that parties to the treaty can deploy only a limited number and certain types of weaponry within the AOA. Some signatory countries actually lie outside the AOA or their territories extend beyond it; for them, limits apply only to any of their forces stationed in the zones of Europe established by the treaty. The first negotiations addressed only equipment levels in the AOA; follow-up negotiations addressed troop limits, resulting in the CFE 1A document (discussed below).

The CFE limits the use of five categories of arms within its AOA: tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. Limits on the equipment levels allotted to each country are stated in the treaty according to each country's boundaries and according to the zones beyond its sovereign territory in which it may operate. These four zones lie in a concentric fashion that calls for fewer troops and fewer weapons deployed the closer one moves to the center of Europe. The smallest of the zones is the central zone; the largest is the flank zone, on the northern and southern flanks of Europe.

Further limits on the number of combat vehicles a single country could possess altogether are also stated in the treaty. A restriction to 20,000 tanks, 30,000 ACVs, 20,000 heavy artillery pieces, 2,000 attack helicopters, and 6,800 combat aircraft in the AOA for all NATO and former Warsaw Pact members is also imposed. Each alliance divides its "bloc" limit among member parties. One state cannot possess more than one-third of the treaty's allowed maximums.

As of 2004, Russia's continued presence in Chechnya stood starkly in violation of the CFE, but Russia continued to unilaterally destroy military items it inherited from the Soviet Union. On the tenth anniversary of the treaty in November 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated his support of the treaty and said Russia would comply with the CFE as soon as its military operations in Chechnya ended.

The CFE embraces several methods of compliance, including onsite inspections, information exchanges, and national/multinational technical means. All of these are overseen by the Joint Consultative Group of Vienna, Austria. The types of inspection permitted by the treaty are several: announced inspections of declared sites, challenge inspections within a specified area (for which, if a country refuses the inspection, it is required to issue a reasonable assurance of compliance), and inspections to verify the destruction or redeployment of equipment.

The Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

The Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, also called the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1A (CFE 1A) Treaty, was intended as a politically, not legally, binding document that does not have to be ratified. Signed on July 17, 1992, its point was to limit or reduce personnel levels in the AOA of the CFE treaty. Parties to the treaty are generally members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact, plus those countries that were part of the former Soviet Union located in the AOA of the CFE. Each country sets its own limits on personnel levels. Once set, these limits are open to discussion but not negotiation. Personnel counted within the limits can be (1) active-duty land or air forces, including land-based air defense; (2) command and staff of those units; (3) land-based naval aircraft and naval infantry, coastal defense units, and other forces holding equipment under the CFE treaty; or (4) reserve personnel called up for active duty for more than ninety days. Seabased naval personnel, internal security units, and forces under UN command are exempt. The treaty sets forth additional measures to stabilize personnel, such as forty-two day advance notification required to: increase personnel strength by more than 1,000; increase an air force unit by more than 500; or call up more than 35,000 reservists (except if the reservists are called up for natural disasters or other emergencies). At a meeting held in Vienna, Austria, in 2001, the thirty states who are parties to the treaty reaffirmed their continuing commitment to the CFE.

The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies

Signed by thirty-three countries, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (often referred to as simply the Wassenaar Arrangement) was developed in 1998 to promote transparency and set arms sales limitations on certain weapons and dual-use goods and technologies. Its signatories include Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The countries have agreed to a control list in terms of their weapons exports.

These countries actively participate in preventative enforcement, follow-up investigations, and information exchanges to control dual-use equipment. Dual-use items are equipment and materials considered to be controlled commodities that either cannot be exported at all or that require an export license because of the potential for misuse. The items, such as certain telecommunications equipment, chemicals, or even microorganisms and toxins, have potential civilian as well as military uses.

To ensure that surplus military equipment does not get into the wrong hands, parties to the Wassenaar Arrangement agreed to increase safeguards on military equipment. They agreed that surplus military equipment should fall under the same export controls as new materials and that the physical security of, and inventory controls on, these materials should be increased. To ensure that its goals are met, the Wassenaar Arrangement requires data exchanges biannually (in April and October) to report on transactions from the previous six months. The arrangement continued to undergo refinement in 2003 and 2004 as additional categories of small arms and light weapons were added to control lists.